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Abstract 
This study argues that the ease at which economic agents have access to foreign 
earnings would influence/increase the level of dollarization in the economy. The three 
sources of foreign currency earnings are financial integration, trade openness and 
natural resource rent. As such, we extend the determinants of dollarization to capture 
these variables. A dataset of 26 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) for the period 
2001 – 2012 was built. Based on Tobit regression, we found that all the proxies of 
foreign currency earning, with the exception of natural resource rent, are significant 
contributors to the increasing rate of dollarization. Specifically, it was found that trade 
openness and financial liberalization are positive determinants of dollarization, while 
natural resource rent serves as drag to the dollarization process. These results remain 
valid to three robustness tests. Policy implications and suggestions for future research 
were proposed. 
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1. Introduction 
The ensuing effects of globalization on the one hand, and the negative consequences 
of macroeconomic instability on the other hand, had made policymakers and scholars 
beam their searchlight on Financial Dollarization (FD)
1
. In the case of the former and 
                                                        
1
 Financial Dollarization and Currency Substitution (CS) are sometimes used interchangeably in the 
literature. Even though both phenomenon address the same issue, they are however, conceptually 
different. The difference lies on government policy interventions in adopting foreign currency as means 
 3 
as a result of international trade and investment, there are incentives for multinational 
corporations to hold varieties of foreign currencies. In the case of the latter, among 
the suggested solutions to macroeconomic instability is the adoption of FD. In 
addition to the above scenarios, it could be argued that asset diversification is also an 
important determinant of FD (Murray and Powell, 2003; Sharma et al., 2005; and 
Levy-Yeyati, 2006)
2
.  
Regions, such as Lain America and Eastern Europe, which are characterized 
by macroeconomic instability, have been the focal point of earlier studies between 
1980s and early 2000. For instance, Argentina experienced a high degree of FD 
during the period 1980-1984, while Mexico’s case was recorded during the period 
1977-1980. The resultant effect of financial liberalization in countries such as Bolivia, 
Peru, and Uruguay is the high degree of substitutability between the local and foreign 
currencies (Ramirez-Rojas, 1985; Calvo and Vegh, 1992). Asia has received some 
attention in the literature. Sharma et al. (2005) state that only two countries in the 
region, Japan and South Korea, have empirical studies to their credit. The policy 
coordination in Europe, which led to the adoption of Euro as the legal tender among 
selected European countries, accounts for the reason why studies are lacking in the 
region. 
Investigations on the effects of FD in African economies are rather 
burgeoning. Prior to these studies, it would have been misleading to assume that the 
subject matter is not an African phenomenon. The implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in most African countries in the late 1980s, which led 
to financial liberalization and the removal of restrictions on the use of foreign 
currencies, had led to the increase in the demand/use for/of foreign currencies 
alongside with local currencies (Yinusa, 2009). For instance, within a year of 
liberalizing its financial sector, Tanzania recorded 15% of foreign currency deposit in 
total monetary deposit (Kessy, 2011). The average rate of FD in Liberia and the 
Congo Republic is estimated to be in the region of about 80%. This is closely 
                                                                                                                                                              
of legal tender, which is the case of CS. Even though both concepts are different in their respective 
rights, they are however used interchangeably in this study. This is premised on the fact that no country 
in sub-Saharan Africa has adopted a foreign currency as legal tender, although Zimbabwe has been 
using the USD alongside her local currency as legal tender. 
2
 However, caution must be exercised when interpreting asset diversification as a fall-out of FD. This is 
based on the findings of Gosh et al. (1998) that countries with high portfolio denominated in foreign 
currencies seem to have low inflationary pressure, more stable exchange rate movements than countries 
with relatively low levels of FD. 
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followed by Angola and Sao Tomé and Principle with 70% and 60%, respectively. 
The average level of FD for SSA for the period 2001 to 2012 stood at 30% (IMF, 
2015). Hence, Africa is considered to be in the league of the “dollarizing” economies 
in the world
3
. 
Giovanni and Turtelboom (1994) argued that the theoretical foundation for FD 
is based on the theory of demand for money. They laid emphasis on cash-in-advance 
model and transaction cost models. In the first model, the return differential (proxied 
by inflation) between domestic currency and foreign currencies serves as the basis for 
demand of either of the two sets of currencies. In essence, the decision on which 
currency to demand for is purely business/economic induced. This is consistent with 
the three types of FD De Nicolé et al. (2003) identified
4
. The IMF (2015) has 
developed a broad model to account for some perceived important determinants of 
FD, among which are market failure, institutions, portfolio and access to foreign 
exchange. The IMF further argued that these determinants have been neglected by 
earlier studies. 
This study takes a cue from the ease of access to foreign exchange (FOREX). 
The ease at which economic agents, households, firms and the government have 
access to FOREX would to a large extend determine the level of demand for and use 
of foreign currencies. The three fundamental motives for the demand for money are 
unit of account, store of value and medium of exchange. In a liberalized economy 
with no restrictions on the use of foreign currencies, the flexibility of the substitution 
between foreign and local currencies would be high. Hence, economic agents would 
be faced with the option of either demanding for money in domestic currency or in a 
basket of foreign currencies. For instance, in countries with unstable macroeconomic 
policies, firms and individuals are likely to hedge against potential loss by 
denominating their assets in foreign currency(ies). This satisfies the store of value 
function of the demand for money. 
It is common knowledge that countries with high levels and perhaps 
hyperinflation would transact and pay for goods and services in foreign currencies. 
Kessy (2011) and IMF (2015) document that United States Dollars  (USD) are used to 
                                                        
3
 A country is considered to be highly “dollarized” if the ratio of the measure of FD exceeds 30% 
(Balino, Bennett and Boreinztein; 1999; IMF, 2015). However, Sepulveda’s (2000) classification is in 
the following form: below 20% (low dollarization); between 21-70% (mild dollarization) and above 
70% (high dollarization). This study adopts the first classification due to its relative simplistic range as 
compared with the latter classification. 
4
Financial, payment and real dollarization. 
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pay for services- such as accommodation rents and purchases, schools fees, among 
other high value consumer durables- in Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Zimbabwe. Multinational Corporations pay their expatriate staffs’ wages and 
allowances in foreign currency. In essence, the argument this study seeks to make is 
that easy access to FOREX fuels FD. This is a gap that has not been “adequately” 
investigated. 
The objective of this study is to examine the extent to which access to FOREX 
magnifies/dampens the level of FD in SSA countries. Based on the foregoing, three 
major sources of FOREX are considered. They are  (i) natural resource rent; (ii) total 
export; and (iii) International capital inflow (proxied with financial integration)
5
. 
Based on data constraints, the scope of this study is limited to 26 countries in SSA for 
the period 2001-2012
6
.  
The contribution of this inquiry to existing literature is twofold, notably, in 
terms of scope and hypothesized role of FOREX. First, on the dimension of scope, 
studies on FDfocusing on Africa are very few. To the best of our knowledge, only two 
studies (Yinusa, 2009 and IMF, 2015) are based on panel data while the remaining are 
country-specific studies
7
. Hence, this study adds to the scarce African literature on 
FD. The second innovation is based on the hypothesized role of FOREX. To date, 
Kessy (2011) and IMF (2015) are closest to this study. However, the point of 
departure (considering IMF’s paper) lies on the proxies for the sources of FOREX. As 
an analogy, the three IMF proposed sources of FOREX (exports, oil export and sum 
of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) deposit and loan (all expressed as a ratio 
of GDP)) can be questioned on the following grounds. (i) Not all African countries 
are oil-endowed. Countries like South Africa, Liberia, Kenya, and Togo among 
others, have no oil export. As an improvement to this measure, natural resource rent is 
proposed
8
. This is considered as a more generic source of FOREX. (ii) While 
                                                        
5
 Financial integration is a difficult concept to measure. It should be noted that there are different 
measures or indices of financial integration, however, the index provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006) has been adjudged to be a better measurement. 
6
 See the Appendix for a list of selected countries. 
7
 See Yinusa and Akinlo (2008a), Imam (2009), Erasmus et al. (2009), Kessy (2011), for more 
narratives. 
8
 The World Bank classifies natural resources into four groups: Oil, forest, mineral, and natural gas. 
Due to lack of data, resources such as diamond were not captured in the computation of mineral sub-
components.  Hence, countries like Botswana with huge deposits of diamonds would have a low level 
of mineral rent because their bulk of endowments were not considered. To the best of our knowledge,  
the World Bank’s classification has the most comprehensive dataset. In the context of this study, total 
natural rent, defined as the summation of these classifications, is used. 
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acknowledging that the BIS’s deposit and loan serve as proxies for the source of 
FOREX, there would be a problem of multicollinearity in the baseline equation. This 
is premised on the fact that whatever the measure of the FD adopted, it would be 
highly correlated with BIS loans and deposits. (iii) There could also be 
multicollinearity between exports and oil export. Unlike Kessy (2011) who ignored 
the growing importance of remittances in his computation of foreign capital flows, we 
considered a holistic approach to measuring this variable- through the adoption of 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) database. 
This study is significant to SSA because of the following reasons: (i) an in-
depth understanding of the nature of FD would be unraveled; (ii) even though it is 
widely acclaimed that the region is macro-economically unstable, this study would 
shed light on whether the increasing level of FD is being driven by this instability and  
(iii) policy prescriptions would be derived from the empirical results.  
Following this introductory section, the rest of this study is structured as 
follows. Section two sheds light on some important conceptual issues and presents 
some stylized facts about the evolution of FD on global, regional and country-specific 
bases. Section three engages the extant literature. Methodological related issues are 
presented in Section four. The empirical results are discussed in Section five, while 
Section Six concludes with policy recommendations and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
2. Background to the study 
This section aims to dwell on the presentation of some stylized facts about the 
evolution of both FD and access to sources of FOREX in SSA. This is to help gather 
some background information of the region using these variables. Based on the 
foregoing, discussion in this section would be bifurcated into two phases. In the first 
phase, statistics of FD would be presented based on global, regional and country-
specific cases. The second phase would give an overview of the three identified 
sources of FOREX. 
Table 1 below shows the level of FD from a global perspective. Based on a 
30% threshold, it could be established that the world is dollarized (see Footnote 3). It 
is equally observed that across the regions, with the exception of SSA, loan FD has a 
lower magnitude as compared with the deposit magnitude. The reason adduced for 
this cannot be unrelated to the fact that the region is considered to be capital starved, 
 7 
hence the need to rely on external financial inflow, which is usually financed via 
foreign currency. It is also correct to state that the region is the most dollarized in the 
world. Next on the ladder is Latin America and the Caribbean. The high level of FD 
could be explained by the fact that some Latin American countries such as Argentina, 
Bolivia, El-Salvador, Ecuador, and Peru have given-up their national currencies for 
the adoption of the USD. Coincidentally, this region was the first to have considered 
dollarization as a solution to its macroeconomic fundamentals. The foreign direct 
investment drive in India and China is a contributory factor for mild level of FD in the 
region. 
 
Table 1:  Global trends of Financial Dollarization 
Region Deposit FX Loan FX 
SSA 29.6 30.5 
Latin America and Caribbean 28.2 25.1 
East & South Asia and the Pacific 19.5 18.95 
Middle East and North Africa 15.6 12.3 
Average 29.1 27 
Authors’ computation with underlying data from IFS and IMF (2015) 
 
Figure 1: Pictorial Analysis of Dollarization in SSA 
 
Source: IMF (2015) 
 
Figure 1 above shows the pictorial overview of dollarization in SSA, Table 2 presents 
the trend of FD in the selected SSA countries. It could be inferred from the table that 
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the top-three dollarized economies in SSA are the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Liberia and Angola. Going by the threshold of IMF (2015), other countries 
that can equally be classified as highly dollarized economies are Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Ghana. The moderately dollarized economies 
are Uganda, Eritrea, Kenya and Malawi. The remaining countries are classified as low 
dollarized economies. It is also interesting to point out that for the period 2009-2012, 
with the exceptions of the DRC, Djibouti, Kenya and Sierra Leone, SSA as a region 
recorded a decline in the use of foreign currency (ies) domestically. The attendant 
effect of the global financial crisis in 2007/2008 might account for the dwindling use 
of the foreign currency.  
The literature has identified that among the chief causes of dollarization is 
misalignment in macroeconomic fundamentals. Among the macroeconomic 
fundamentals are inflation, high exchange rate volatility, and interest rate, among 
others. Starting with the top three dollarized economies, statistics have shown that 
there is relative high inflation rate in these economies. For instance, the average 
inflation rates (2001-2012) for Angola, and Congo, are 43% and 42%, respectively. 
As regards volatility of exchange rate, Angola and the DRC, recorded 21% and 247%, 
respectively.  Extending our investigation into low dollarized economies, we can state 
that the SSA dataset validates the argument in the literature as regards the importance 
of macroeconomic stability in the dollarization discourse. However, it is surprising to 
infer that these causes of macroeconomic instability are not valid using the Liberian 
dataset. Hence, there must be some specific factors behind this incidence.   
 
Table 2: Country-Specific Background of Financial Dollarization in SSA 
Country 2001-04 2005-08 2009-12 2001-2012 
Angola 76.67 66 55.5 66.06 
Botswana 23.15 17.14 25.92 22.07 
Burundi 7.5 12.63 14.56 11.56 
Cape Verde 6.2 6.74 6.43 6.46 
Comoros 2.23 1 1 1.41 
Congo, DR 80.23 84.73 85.27 83.41 
Djibouti 58.45 54.73 57.13 56.77 
Eritrea 18.38 18.98 15.99 17.78 
Ghana 30.58 29.26 28.5 29.45 
Guinea 25.17 30.22 21.45 25.61 
Kenya 15.87 15.03 16.24 15.71 
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Liberia 76.8 83.03 82.6 80.81 
Malawi 19.52 17.88 16.52 17.97 
Mauritius 14.98 19.92 15.34 16.75 
Mozambique 49.5 42.25 34.75 42.17 
Namibia 1.73 1.21 0.84 1.26 
Nigeria 8.94 10.32 13.83 11.03 
Rwanda 30.01 24.03 22.13 25.39 
Sao Tome 48.66 60.42 56.5 55.19 
Seychelles 4.34 15.73 27.76 15.94 
Sierra Leone 27.35 30.01 34.87 30.74 
South Africa 1.45 1.25 1 1.23 
Tanzania 40.5 38.25 34.51 37.75 
Uganda 30.87 26.18 26.45 27.83 
Zambia 49.37 41.26 38.25 42.96 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
 
 
An attempt is being made to extend the literature to capture some perceived 
important determinants such as the proxy for financial integration. Data obtained from 
the wealth of nations (see Lanes and Milesi-Ferreti, 2006) show that liberalized 
financial sectors account for the seemingly high dollarization. Specifically, 
considering the period of investigation (i.e 2001 - 2012), Angola recorded about $700 
million worth of financial transactions, the DRC ($180 million); Tanzania ($208 
million); Zambia ($218 million) and Ghana ($214 million), although some low 
dollarized economies still recorded high capital mobility. A likely justification for 
countries such as South Africa, Nigeria to have high capital mobility might be: (i) 
their large market sizes and (ii) resource rent they generate.  
Theory is not explicit on the relationship between dollarization and foreign 
reserves. However, historical data has suggested that there is a positive relationship 
between these variables. Hence, when reserve is high, dollarization might also be 
high. Drawing inferences from the Nigerian experience (especially around mid 2015 
to early 2016), with the dwindling reserves, financial institutions are barred from 
accepting foreign currencies as deposits from their customers. Based on the scope of 
this study, data has also revealed that there is a positive relationship between 
international reserves and the dollarization index.  See Table 3 for more details. 
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Table 3: Financial Dollarization and selected macroeconomic variables 
Country Fin 
Dol 
Inflation ExrVola Reserves Fin Int 
Angola 64.5 43.01 21.58 11.6 700.99 
Botswana 22.3  8.47 0.92 7.35 188.68 
Burundi 11.4 10.03 161.01 0.18 21.10 
Cape Verde 6.43 2.63 14.07 0.25 26.38 
Comoros 1.4 3.43 67.26 0.17 5.96 
Congo, DR 83.3 42.65 247.65 0.52 179.97 
Djibouti 56.7 3.78 2.88 0.15 22.01 
Eritrea 17.8  1.29 0.06 19.76 
Ghana 29.6 15.68 0.34 2.54 214.54 
Guinea 24.8 15.52 1823.67 0.11 62.37 
Kenya 16.2 10.54 5.98 2.81 218.66 
Liberia 80.8 10.29 7.63 0.19 79.30 
Malawi 17.9 12.43 47.16 0.18 36.97 
Mauritius 16.8 5.72 1.58 1.78 3,494.7 
Mozambique 42.1 9.98 3.68 1.53 160.13 
Namibia 1.2 6.20 1.17 0.95 148.36 
Nigeria 10.75 12.67 15.07 31.51 1,808.13 
Rwanda 24.5 7.34 48.71 0.54 33.18 
Sao Tome 55.1 15.76 3843.71 0.04 5.73 
Seychelles 15.8 7.93 3.54 0.13 33.79 
Sierra Leone 30.7 12.61 798.60 0.34 26.30 
South Africa 1.25 5.90 1.68 24.45 4,920.21 
Tanzania 37.8 8.09 222.45 2.68 208.66 
Uganda 27.8 8.13 288.7 1.98 135.413 
Zambia 43.0 14.02 0.558 1.18 213.08 
Source: Authors’ Computation. Note Fin Dol is financial dollarization, ExrVola is exchange rate 
volatility, and Fin Int is a proxy for financial integration. 
 
 
 
There is no denying the fact that SSA is endowed with diverse natural resources and 
these resources account for a considerable share of GDP. A country is considered to 
be resource-rich if: (i) export of natural resources accounts for one-fourth of the total 
export and (ii) if natural resource rent accounts for more than 30% of its GDP 
(Lundgren et al., 2013). Also, the second condition above is likened to natural 
resource dependence.  
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Figure 2: Natural Resource Distribution in SSA 
 
Source: Lundgren et al. (2013). 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of non-renewable natural resources in SSA. The figure 
depicts that the major natural resources of the region are: oil, gas, gold and diamond. 
Figure 3 shows the intensity of natural resource dependence within the region.  
The identified resource-rich countries are Angola, Liberia, Nigeria and 
Burundi. There is the need to extend the threshold set by Lundgren et al. (2013) to 
account for mild/moderately-dollarized economies. As such, countries with resource 
rents of between 21-29% of GDP are classified as moderately resource-rich, while 
those with below 20% are low resource-rich countries. The point to note here is that 
moderate- and high resource-rich countries coincidentally have high degrees of FD. 
Hence this serves as the first pointer to the fact that access to FOREX fuels FD. 
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Figure 3: Natural Resource Rent as a Ratio of GDP  
 
Source: Authors’ Computation.  
 
Table 4 shows the remaining proxies for sources of FOREX. Panel A shows 
financial inflows into SSA, while Panel B shows export earnings of the selected 
countries. It is acknowledged that there could be a problem of multicollinearity 
between export and natural resource rent. This is premised on the fact that most 
countries in SSA are import-dependent and only export primary raw materials. Hence, 
natural resources, including but not limited to agricultural product, would form the 
principal component of their exports. The inclusion of exports is to serve as 
robustness checks to the empirical results. The following points could be drawn from 
Table 4. 
 The financially liberalized economies include South Africa, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and the DRC. 
 These countries, excluding South Africa have high degrees of FD. 
 Countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, the DRC, Ghana, Angola have high 
degrees of trade liberalization, going by their export proceeds. Also, these 
countries have high degrees of FD. 
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Table 4: Other sources of FOREX 
Country 
PANEL A PANEL B 
Financial Integration Export 
2001-04 2005-08 2009-12 2001-2012 2001-04 2005-08 2009-12 2001-2012 
Angola 89083.59 108,907 165,029 363,020 38778.53 157522.71 232816.65 232,816.65 
Botswana 13278.91 14,857 20,506 48,642 16225.30 20509.14 26238.11 26,238.11 
Burundi 5229.77 6,365 4,599 16,194 192.01 431.37 762.27 762.27 
Cape Verde 3595.72 6,123 9,813 19,532 913.04 2125.77 2779.37 2,779.37 
Comoros 1150.33 1,394 1,322 3,866 201.26 262.84 352.09 352.09 
Congo, DR 50147.16 56,399 48,640 155,186 6001.04 19858.26 32812.14 32,812.14 
Djibouti 1689.26 3,477 6,735 11,901 945.22 1266.74 1697.39 1697.39 
Eritrea 3930.47 5,456 14,190 23,577 642.02 678.45 678.45 678.45 
Ghana 38897.49 41,274 86,479 166,650 11568.20 22092.84 48506.13 48,506.13 
Guinea 13924.21 16,290 21,779 51,993 3186.79 4722.28 6252.29 6252.29 
Kenya 32164.53 41,576 57,920 131,660 14119.53 26641.35 37300.13 37,300.13 
Liberia 24956.12 28,498 22,707 76,161 1268.73 2137.58 3391.56 3391.56 
Malawi 13892.76 8,432 8,662 30,987 2135.15 3296.00 5592.80 5592.80 
Mauritius 9305.68 31,199 1,202,673 1,243,178 12427.13 17127.47 21017.09 21,017.09 
Mozambique 29537.55 38,514 54,341 122,393 5232.08 10933.76 14506.43 14,506.43 
Namibia 15188.01 21,426 33,502 70,116 6743.73 12870.72 19213.58 19,213.58 
Nigeria 244913.47 290,689 428,708 964,311 103333.55 271703.29 337203.51 337,203.51 
Rwanda 7076.52 4,780 8,380 20,236 621.82 1561.13 3147.90 3,147.90 
Sao Tome 1421.53 1,394 1,622 4,437 57.30 63.70 103.03 103.03 
Seychelles 5939.91 11,508 10,157 27,606 2305.12 3639.47 3570.25 3,570.25 
Sierra Leone 6598.31 6,103 8,213 20,915 571.69 1235.29 2689.03 2689.03 
South Africa 423294.30 885,784 1,357,626 2,666,704 177915.41 334776.60 420840.13 420,840.13 
Tanzania 43078.86 45,962 71,697 160,738 8450.28 16097.20 27465.39 27,465.39 
Uganda 23265.03 25,728 44,981 93,974 3353.31 8629.76 16011.53 16,011.53 
Zambia 45590.40 42,772 62,847 151,209 5487.12 16737.07 31200.36 31,200.36 
Source: Authors’ Computation with underlining data from WDI, UNCTAD and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) 
 
 
3.0 Literature Review 
Unlike other issues in macroeconomics, studies on FD have revealed two 
distinctive and interesting features. The first relates to the geography of coverage. As 
earlier stated in the introductory section, the concept of FD first gained prominence in 
Latin America. This was essentially because of the increasing rate at which studies 
directed attention towards understanding the nature, causes and effects of financial 
crises in countries of the region. 
The second interesting feature is due to the fact the core objective has been to 
determine the factors that influence FD. In essence, studies have focused mainly on 
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estimating a money demand equation. This is in sharp contrast with other topics in 
macroeconomics, as each topic has got different policy objectives and thus has 
refrained from estimating one “broad” type of baseline equation. 
An overview of the FD literature has shown that studies have towed four main 
lines of scientific enquiry. 
 Price movement and its effect on store of value 
 Relative rate of return on portfolio 
 Institutions and policy credibility 
 The consequences of FD on financial deepening 
 
3.1 Price movement and its effect in store of value 
The main focus of this argument is how inflation and exchange rate affect the 
dynamics of FD in an economy. Mundell (1963) was the first to assert that demand 
for money (denominated in either local/foreign currencies) is a function of exchange 
rate, interest rate and income. The case where an environment is characterized by 
unstable macroeconomic policies (such as inflation and volatility of exchange rate, 
among other) serves as incentives for economic agents to want to edge against any 
potential risk, hence diversify their portfolio to capture the presence/utilization of 
foreign currencies.  
Studies prior to Arango and Nadiri (1989) have focused on modeling the 
demand for money by ignoring the influence of international/foreign monetary 
developments
9
.  Arango and Nadiri’s paper is considered as one of the first sets of 
studies to account for the role of foreign market interventions. Relying on a simplified 
portfolio model and focusing on Canada, United Kingdom, the United States and 
Germany, their results, among other findings, show that changes in foreign interest 
rate and exchange rate expectations play a vital role in the decision of substitution 
between domestic and foreign assets. Bordo and Choudhiri (1982) following the 
argument of the above study focused on Canada and found that the most important 
determinant of demand for foreign currency is ‘expected exchange rate depreciation’. 
Using Thailand as a case study, Bahmani-Oskooee and Techaratanachai 
(2001) found that exchange rate depreciation is the cause of currency substitution. 
This is due to the fact that as currency depreciates, broad money supply in circulation 
                                                        
9
 See Goldfled (1973) for a survey of traditional demand for money. 
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reduces. Similarly, Kaplan et al. (2008), applying the Johansen and Juselius co-
integration method using Turkish dataset, found the existence of a long-run co-
integrating relationship among variables in the model. It was concluded that the 
positive coefficient on exchange rate implies currency substitution. However, Akinlo 
(2003) whose study centers on determining the consequences of exchange rate 
depreciation on FD, found that depreciation of the local currency does not cause FD, 
rather the holders of foreign currencies see depreciation in terms of increasing wealth. 
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003 and 2005) highlight the importance of exchange rate and 
inflation volatility. In their results, it was established that dollarization is likely to 
persist as long as inflation volatility remains high in relation to real exchange rate 
volatility. This stance is also obtainable in low inflationary pressure environments. 
Arteta (2002) focused on developing and transition economies to examine the 
effect of exchange rate regime on the level of financial dollarization. It is widely 
argued that flexible exchange rate regimes encourage banks to match dollar-
denominated liabilities with a corresponding amount of dollar-denominated assets, 
ameliorating currency mismatches. The results have it that flexible regime exacerbate 
currency mismatch and also encourages deposit dollarization more than credit 
dollarization. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) estimated that a fixed exchange 
rate regime fuels deposit dollarization. Arteta (2003) and Weymouth (2011) through 
their results, found that flexible exchange rate increases the level of deposit 
dollarization. These results were however conditioned upon the existence of a relative 
stable exchange rate. Contrary to these views, Honig (2009) and Berkmen and 
Cavallo (2010) in their respective papers have empirically invalidated the claim that 
an exchange rate regime has deterministic power on the level of dollarization. 
 
3.2 Relative Rate of Return 
The decision to switch between local and foreign currencies is purely a business 
decision and is predicated on the interest rate differential between two economies. 
Essentially, if the foreign currency has a higher interest rate, there would be an 
increase in the demand for that currency which does leads to depreciation of the 
domestic currency. Thus, both interest rate spread and exchange rate volatility are 
inter-related, which supports the view of uncovered interest rate parity. 
Sahay and Vegh (1996) stated that FD positively responds to the real interest 
rate differentials between domestic and foreign denominated assets. It was also 
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further suggested that inflation has an indirect effect on FD. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that a fall in inflation would only affect FD only if inflation first has an 
effect on real interest rate. Savastano (1996) focused on the pattern of dollarization in 
five Latin American countries for the period 1970-1993. He posits that FD is 
attributed to an incidence of macroeconomic instability, institutional quality as well as 
a high interest rate spread between domestic and foreign economies. Chief of the 
three factors is the role of the wide interest rate spread for the region. Basso et al. 
(2011) suggest that wider interest rate differentials on loans have a positive impact on 
loan dollarization, while the inverse is the case for deposit dollarization.  
Licandro and Licandro (2003) state that the interest rate ceiling is unable to 
fizzle out the inflationary pressure and the absence of inflation index asset would 
force domestic residents to resort to convert the composition of their assets to foreign-
denominated. Results of Kessy (2011) suggest that a percentage point increase in the 
expected rate of return would, in the long run, lead to about 6percent increase in the 
dollar deposit.  
Even though Sahay and Vegh (1996) were among the first set of studies to 
have identified the importance of the interest rate spread, they however concluded that 
the variable is more pronounced in Eastern Europe than in Latin America. Balino et 
al. (1999) held a similar view. Several rejoinders have been made to the claim above. 
For instance, Arteta (2002) concluded that the explanatory power of interest rate 
spread is poor. Civcir (2003) proclaims that there are exceptions to the positive 
linkage between high real rate of return and the composition of assets. Also, Catao 
and Terrones (2000) argue that interest rate plays a dual role. In the first role for low 
or semi-dollarized economies, increase in the external interest rate would induce local 
economic agents to switch allegiance to the use of foreign portfolios. On the other 
hand, decline in the foreign interest rate would serve as attraction for financial 
intermediaries to seek for cheap sources of credit abroad and in turn; advance foreign 
denominated credit to their local clients, in a bid to hedge against any potential 
devaluation.  Hence, the exact effect of interest rate is mixed. 
 
3.3 Institutional Factors and Credible Policy Stance 
In the dollarization process, there are ample reasons to assume that institutions 
have some fundamental roles to play. Among early proponents of this debacle include 
Savastano (1992) who showed that the quality of institutions has strong influences on 
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the variables that lead to the dollarization process. The main argument here lies on the 
credibility of government policies. A weak institutional level would send signals to 
economic agents about unreliability of government policies Levy-Yeyati (2006). It 
has also been realized that enforcement of contract might be problematic due to poor 
form of governance. The reckless behavior of the executive arm of governance who in 
a bid to finance deficit and create short-term output growth, resort to printing of new 
currencies, which thus exert inflationary pressure on the economy and hence, leads to 
dollarization (Honig, 2005; Aizenman et al., 2005 and Doblas-Madrid, 2009). Also, 
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) state that loss of banks’ balance sheet, courtesy of poor 
supervisory role of the monetary authorities, makes it costly for monetary authorities 
to curtail inflation by increasing interest rate. The collapse of monetary regime could 
also be a driving force for dollarization (Ize and Parrado, 2002). In the eventual case 
of banking crisis, investors would be weary of the commitment of government to bail 
out the debtors in the event of devaluation and further compounds to the mispricing 
associated with government guarantees (DeNicolo et al., 2003). 
Honig (2009) used a dataset of 66 selected countries to argue that even in the 
face of low inflationary pressure and controlled exchange rate volatility, lack of trust 
in government about her ability to adopt policies that would ensure long-term stability 
and credibility of the currency would lead to dollarization. Weymouth (2011) proxied 
institutions with veto player, a check on the policymakers’ decision on property right. 
Based on the underpinning argument about veto players
10
, the larger the number of 
players in the settings, the lower would be the rate of dollarization in such an 
economy. De Nicoloet al. (2005) suggest that shifting from a highly restrictive to a 
completely unrestricted or liberal political system increases uncertainty and risk, and 
induces shifts in agent portfolios in favor of foreign assets. Jeanne (2003) and Calvo 
and Guidotti (1989) analyzed how lack of monetary credibility increases the rate of 
growth of FD.   
In an interesting article, Neanidis and Savva (2013) claimed that there are two 
direct linkages between institutions and dollarization in the accession of Europe: 
confidence instilled in economic agents and the high rate of convergence of exchange 
rates to the euro due to the adoption of common currency. Unlike extant literature that 
                                                        
10
 It is assumed that veto players consist of representatives of diverse group and stakeholders in a 
country. To reach a decision, the interests of these diverse groups must have been accounted for. 
Hence, opportunistic decision by certain groups would be rejected. 
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has listed the direct causes of FD to (i) inflation and exchange rare/ exchange rate 
regime; (ii) interest rate spread; (iii) institutions; and (iv) minimum variance portfolio, 
Neanidis and Savva (2013) showed that institutions are indirectly related to the four 
identified causes above. It was concluded that institutions have significant coefficients 
for both deposit and credit dollarization. 
Despite the general agreement about the importance of institutions in explaining 
FD, the major weakness of this strand of literature is its inability to be explicit about 
what part of institutions and why is it important. Rather, studies are more concerned 
with the correlation coefficients (Weymouth, 2011). 
 
3.4 Financial Development 
The concept dollarization was changed to financial dollarization when it was 
noticed that the financial sectors have a great share in the cause of dollarization. There 
are several ways in which the financial sector is linked to dollarization. Among the 
debate include the misallocation effect: a situation in which the banks would want to 
hedge against risk and thus match their liabilities with assets. This being the case the 
bulk of the risk is now transferred to the holders of their assets. If a significant share 
of deposit and credit is foreign currency-denominated, this might pose a risk for the 
stability of the sector. Hence, it is accentuated that among the causes of financial 
instability is the increasing level of dollarization.  In a similar view, the level of 
development of the financial sector has a lot to say about the ability of the sector to 
withstand exogenous shocks created by the increasing activities of foreign currency 
(De Nicolo et al., 2003; Levy-Yeyati, 2006). 
In an interesting study by Honohan and Shi (2002), it was revealed that a high 
level of dollarization enhances further deepening of the financial sector. Though the 
results are only obtainable in inflationary economies, De Nicolo et al. (2003) reached 
a similar conclusion to that of Honohan and Shi (2002). In addition to that, it was 
stated that the cause of financial instability could equally be attributed to 
dollarization. Asel (2010) argued that there is a positive correlation between loan 
dollarization and private credit. It was further enunciated that the lower the level of 
financial development, the higher would be the rate of dollarization. Levy-Yeyati 
(2006) used the balance sheet effect of banks to contribute to the debate. Barajas and 
Morales (2003) towed the argument of Levy-Yeyati (2006) to establish that liability 
dollarization of banks causes financial and/or baking crisis through the exposures of 
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private and public balance sheets to exchange rate volatility. They further argued that 
the three major causes of FD are financial development, macro-related and banking-
related explanations. Presence of foreign banks could enhance the degree of currency 
and asset substitutability. IMF (2005) confirmed this position using Ukrainian data. 
Despite the dichotomy in the strands identified in the finance-FD nexus, two 
common conclusions are reached: first, there is a positive correlation between FD and 
proxies of financial development. Second, the exact effect of the relationship between 
these variables is dependent upon inflation. 
 
4.0 Model Specification, Methodology and Data 
In this section, discussion would center on three basic forms of argument. In 
the first form, emphasis would be laid on specifying an estimable equation, drawing 
inferences from previous studies. Next to this would be methodological related issues. 
In this case, an elaborate explanation on the choice of our estimation technique would 
be presented. The last sub-section would attempt to explicit on the scope of the study 
as well as the data sources. 
 
4.1 Model Specification 
Dollarization literature is huge and growing. As earlier indicated above, the 
literature can be decomposed into four levels. Hence, it might seem impossible to 
formulate a model that would completely capture issues surrounding dollarization. 
Taking a cue from Levy-Yeyati (2006), Ize (2013), Kessy (2011), IMF (2015), and 
since the aim of this study is to expand on the perceived important determinants of 
dollarization; the model is specified in the form below: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ∝ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , (1) 
 
where, FD is a proxy for dollarization (foreign currency deposit as a ratio of broad 
money supply). RETURNS is a vector that captures differences between the rate of 
returns of both domestic and foreign currencies. This focuses specifically on the 
portfolio approach to dollarization. The proxies used are interest rate differentials 
between domestic and foreign currencies (INT), exchange rate volatility (SEXR), 
inflation (INF), and exchange rate depreciation (DEP). ACCESS is the main variable 
of interest for this study. It is a vector that captures the relative ease to which foreign 
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currencies are domestically available. The proxies include resource rent (NAT), trade 
openness, (TRA) and degree of financial integration (FINT). CONTROLS are some 
perceived variables that have been validated to be good determinants of dollarization. 
In this study, they include a measure of institutions (INST)
11
, financial development 
(FIN) and GDP per capita growth (GDP), international reserves (RES). 
𝜃 and 𝜌 capture time and country-specific effects, respectively, while 𝜀  is the 
independently and identically distributed (iid) error term component
12
. 
 
 
4.2 Methodology 
Econometrics provides numerous empirical tools in testing the relationship among 
economic variables. Each tool has its merits and demerits. This is to say that no “one 
cap fits all”. The early literature and elementary econometrics have adjudged 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as the best estimator based on its “BLUE” properties. 
This is in addition to its simplistic form of usage. Despite the accolades, among 
others, OLS has been criticized based on its inability to account for endogeneity 
related issues such as reverse causality, measurement error and omitted variable bias. 
Another problem of OLS relates to its nature to break down when censored data is 
used
13
. A censored variable is said to occur when the range of the value of the 
dependent variable is limited for some reasons such as: (i) due to the way the data is 
constructed (using dollarization as an illustration, the limit of the variable is any value 
less than 100
14
); (ii) it could also be a case in which such a variable cannot be 
captured by dummies; (iii) when a significant proportion of the observation of the 
data is exactly the value of the limit and (iv) if there is a possibility of having a 
                                                        
11The proxy used is collected from World Governance Indicators of Kauffmann et al. (1999). 
Essentially, they provided six indicators, which are Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Voice and 
Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Political Stability. The 
variation among these indices would be very minimal; this is just as there is high correlation 
among the indices. The solution to these problems would be to drop some series, which would 
lead to loss of information. A better solution is to aggregate the indices into an index using 
principal component analysis. (Asongu and Nwachukwu ,2016a and b; and Ajide and Raheem, 
2016).  
12See Appendix for variable definition, measurement and a priori expectations. 
13This problem is more peculiar in a situation in which the dependent variable is censored. As 
such, it is less severe for independent variables. 
14 This is due to the fact that 100 FD index implies full dollarization, implying that such a country 
is adopting a foreign currency as its official currency. In such a situation, this type of scientific 
enquiries would be void. Rather, the objective of such an enquiry would be to determine the 
factors affecting money supply in the economy. 
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negative value for the dependent variable (Long, 1997; Green, 2002; Kennedy 
2003and Wooldrige, 2003). 
 
To this end, effort has been channeled to solving this problem. The first attempt was 
by Tobin (1958) who came up with Tobit regression. Essentially, the model entails 
the simultaneous use of maximum likelihood estimation and probit model. 
 
The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958; Carsun and Sun, 2007; Asongu and Le Roux, 
2016) is as follows in Eq. (2):  
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where is a non stochastic constant. In other words, the value of *,tiy is missing when 
it is less than or equal to   .  
 
We address the concern of endogeneity by controlling for both simultaneity using 
instrumented variables
15
.  
 
4.3 Data 
The central focus of this study is limited to 26 countries in SSA. The time frame is 
between 2001 and 2012. The choice of this scope is limited to data availability. The 
main data sources are International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary 
                                                        
15
Literature offers two types of instrument: internal and external. Due to the complexity of finding 
external instruments, we decided to use the former, which entails the usage of lagged differences and 
lagged levels of the explanatory variables. 
 22 
Fund, World Governance Indicators (WGI), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), updated 
in 2013 and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
 
5.0 Empirical Results 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the model. The most 
volatile series, judging by the values of the standard deviation, is exchange rate 
depreciation. As regards the main variable of interest, trade openness has a mean 
value of 77%, which is distantly followed by natural resource abundance and the 
proxy for financial integration. It is important to emphasize that our measure of 
institutions has a negative mean value. This is due to the way the series is constructed 
and also based on the fact that the region has poor institutional development level. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
Categories Variable(s) Mean StdDev MIN MAX 
 
RETURNS 
INF 12.205 24.510 -2.404 359.936 
SEXR 2.846 2.604 -1.069 8.256 
DEP 72.202 287.284 -950.998 2290.15 
INT 7.263 6.130 -2.254 47.862 
 
ACCESS 
TRA 77.073 37.061 20.964 225.015 
NAT 13.785 20.142 0.004 166.189 
FINT 8.962 1.706 5.811 13.651 
 
 
CONTROLS 
RES 20.125 2.093 11.635 24.693 
GDP 7.428 3.891 4.947 25.881 
FIN 24.448 28.997 0.198 160.129 
INST -0.069 0.750 -1.599 1.790 
DEPENDENT FINDEX 29.606 23.439 1.03 90.123 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
 
The results of Equation 1 are presented in Table 6. This section starts by interpreting 
the key variables of interest (ACCESS) of this study. Financial integration has been 
an important source of dollarization in SSA. One percent increase in FINT would 
increase FD by about 2.3%, a coefficient that is significant at the 5% level. This 
confirms historical data on the post-adoption of SAP (financial liberalization policy) 
in 1986, an initiative of the IMF, which had led to increase in the level of foreign 
currency circulation in the domestic economy. It has also been established that trade 
openness and dollarization are positively related. Essentially, an increase in trade 
openness by one percent would lead to about 0.13% increase in the level of 
dollarization in Africa. This conforms to the theoretical dictates. Similarly, IMF 
(2015) established that a percentage point increase in export earnings would increase 
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dollarization by 0.10%. A higher coefficient (0.63) was obtained when oil export was 
used. This implies that economic agents that receive earnings in foreign currency in 
SSA have a tendency to keep part of their proceeds in foreign currency rather than 
converting into domestic currency.  
 
Table 6: Main Results  
Dependent Variable: Deposit Dollarization 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RETURNS INF 0.347* 
(0.078) 
0.144 
(0.031) 
0.251* 
(0.074) 
0.091* 
(0.026) 
0.350* 
(0.075) 
0.127* 
(0.035) 
0.329* 
(0.074) 
0.136** 
(0.061) 
SEXR 0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.054* 
(0.016) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.054* 
(0.017) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.047** 
(0.021) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.062* 
(0.021) 
DEP 0.000 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0038) 
INT 0.040 
(0.108) 
0.012 
(0.034) 
0.033 
(0.104) 
0.008 
(0.027) 
0.042 
(0.108) 
0.011 
(0.029) 
0.001 
(0.108) 
0.0003 
(0.035) 
CONTROLS GDP -1.170* 
(0.302) 
-0.452* 
(0.135) 
-0.700 
(0.918) 
-0.209 
(0.300) 
-0.845 
(1.017) 
-0.266 
(0.367) 
-1.204 
(0.880) 
-0.487 
(0.513) 
INST -4.323** 
(1.881) 
-0.030 
(0.025) 
-5.626* 
(1.640) 
-0.185 
(0.015) 
-5.221* 
(1.842) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
-3.690** 
(1.860) 
-0.036 
(0.054) 
FIN -0.101** 
(0.046) 
-
0.152*** 
(0.092) 
-0.102** 
(0.048) 
-0.126 
(0.080) 
-0.118** 
(0.049) 
-
0.154*** 
(0.087) 
-0.228* 
(0.077) 
-0.493 
(0.806) 
RES 1.639* 
(0.531) 
1.530* 
(0.509) 
1.408* 
(0.452) 
1.093* 
(0.378) 
1.753* 
(0.523) 
1.414** 
(0.601) 
1.228** 
(0.542) 
1.248 
(0.948) 
ACCESS TRA   0.125* 
(0.028) 
0.368* 
(0.098) 
    
NAT     -0.023 
(0.068) 
-0.015 
(0.032) 
  
FINT       2.293** 
(0.949) 
1.068 
(0.963) 
          
DIAGNOSTICS 
 Sigma_u 17.912* 
(4.015) 
 18.481* 
(4.250) 
 18.756* 
(4.589) 
 16.234* 
(3.927) 
 
 Sigma_e 4.637* 
(0.311) 
 4.396* 
(0.298) 
 4.603* 
(0.314) 
 4.564* 
(0.309) 
 
 Rho 0.937 
(0.027) 
   0.943 
(0.028) 
 0.927 
(0.034) 
 
          
Left 
censored 
28   38  38    
Uncensored 125   125  125    
Right 
censored 
118   118  118    
Source: Authors’ Computation 
Note: Values in parenthesis are the standard error statistics. “*”, “**” and “***” imply levels of 
statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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INF is inflation rate, SEXR is exchange rate volatility; DEP is exchange rate depreciation, INT is 
interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign currency. NAT is resource rent; TRA is trade 
openness, and FINT is the degree of financial integration.  INST measures institutions; FIN is financial 
development and GDP per capita growth (GDP) and international reserves (RES) 
 
However, the third proxy of access to foreign currency (natural resource rent) 
seems to have a negative effect, though significant, on dollarization. This is in clear 
contradiction of this study’s hypothesis. Figure four depicts that SSA is endowed with 
oil, gas, gold and other precious metals.  The exploring companies of these resources 
are foreign-based. Once these resources are explored and exported, the proceeds 
appear to be remitted to their headquarters. The royalty being paid to the government, 
in most cases, is usually made through the central banks of the resource-endowed 
countries. Hence, it can be seen that the proceeds from natural resource rents do not 
pass through the domestic financial system. Thus, necessitating resource rent not 
being an important determinant of dollarization. 
It is established that inflation is a positive and significant determinant of 
dollarization in SSA. The coefficients range from 0.091 to 0.350. This result is similar 
to those in De-Nicole (2005), Yinusa (2009), Vieri et al. (2012) and Ize and Levy-
Yeyati (2003). This can be justified using the intuition that high inflationary rate 
reduces the values of money. It also indicates that higher levels of inflation lead to 
reallocations in the portfolio of agents. Such agents will tend to sell domestic assets 
and buy assets denominated in foreign currency. In another related argument, 
Canzoneri and Diba (1992) concluded that dollarization should be a stabilizing tool in 
a high inflationary period. Another important determinant of dollarization is exchange 
rate volatility. The higher the frequency of changes in exchange rate, the higher would 
be unlikely changes of holding the domestic currency. Across all our regressions, it 
was found that this variable is positive and significant, whose coefficient ranges 
between 0.007 and 0.062.  Arango and Nadiri (1981) estimated similar coefficients.  
In all the models, economic growth is estimated to have a negative coefficient. 
The interesting part is that models without the inclusion of proxies for ACCESS yield 
significant results. Higher GDP per capita growth reduces dollarization pressure. 
These results are analogous to Yinusa (2009) and IMF (2015). Yinusa (2009) stated 
that a growing and active economy tends to have a strong productive base to support 
the local currency, hence, put in policies to curtail episodes of dollarization. The 
obtained results support the notion that good and improved institutional/governance 
infrastructure serves as a conduit for reducing incidence of FD. The channel through 
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which governance affects dollarization is through credibility of government policies, 
enforcement of contract, supervisory role of the monetary authorities among other 
channels.  The list of studies whose results are quite similar includes, but not limited 
to Ize and Parrado (2002), De Nicolo, et al. (2005), Honig (2005 and 2009), 
Aizenman et al. (2005), Levy-Yeyati (2006) and Doblas-Madrid (2009). 
Furtherance to the above, Tobit estimates confirm the position that improved 
financial development serves as a good deterrent tool to combat unwanted financial 
dollarization. Across the estimated models, negative and significant coefficients were 
obtained. This is in sharp contrast to theoretical expectation. Also, this study’s results 
seem to invalidate existing empirical studies such as Honohan and Shi (2002), De 
Nicolo et al. (2003) and Asel (2010) among others. A plausible reason for these 
counter-intuitive results might be due to the poor level of financial development of 
most countries in our sample. It is a known fact that SSA has a low level of financial 
development compared to other developing and emerging countries
16
. Hence, the 
channel through which financial development is expected to react on dollarization 
would be the other way round. However, our result confirms the argument of IMF 
(2015) who also estimated a negative coefficient and justified the result on the ground 
that innovations in financial sector products and services would enhance domestic 
currency savings to be invested within the economy. A positive correlation between 
international reserves and dollarization was obtained. Hence, during high periods of 
dollarization, it is safe to assume that the level of international reserves would also be 
high. These results are consistent with those of Yotopolous (1997). 
Three sets of robustness tests were conducted. The first relates to estimating a 
semi-elasticity of the models. These results are presented in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of 
Table 6. The second test takes account of endogenity related issues and thus estimated 
an IVTOBIT regression. The result of this exercise is presented in Table 7. The third 
robustness test entails identifying the outliers in the model and thus, eliminating them 
from the sample. The countries eliminated are Liberia, the DRC, South Africa, 
Comoros and Namibia. Table 8 presents the results of the smaller sample countries. It 
can be summarily stated that these results are not too significantly different from the 
results in Table 6. Hence, our result is robust to different estimation techniques, 
smaller sample size and semi-elasticity based coefficient measurement. 
                                                        
16Though, there are few exceptions to this claim. Data sourced from WDI shows that notable 
examples include, Nigeria, South Africa, Botswana and Egypt 
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Table 7 Robustness Test with IVTOBIT  
Dependent Variable: Deposit Dollarization 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 
RETURNS INF 0.332*** 
(0.189) 
0.152 
(0.169) 
0.281 
(0.184) 
0.151 
(0.175) 
SEXR 0.005** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.001) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.008* 
(0.002) 
DEP 0.004 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
INT 0.293 
(0.341) 
-0.270 
(0.294) 
0.251 
(0.392) 
0.627** 
(0.281) 
CONTROLS GDP -1.558* 
(0.391) 
-1.51* 
(0.369) 
-1.574* 
(0.502) 
-2.232* 
(0.360) 
INST -1.048 
(1.624) 
0.432 
(1.840) 
0.109 
(2.153) 
-7.420* 
(1.820) 
FIN -0.377* 
(0.056) 
-0.512* 
(0.070) 
-0.359* 
(0.065) 
-0.382* 
(0.049) 
RES 3.717** 
(1.597 
-0.847 
(2.989) 
3.487 
(2.423) 
6.327* 
(1.403) 
ACCESS FINT  6.769** 
(2.640) 
 0.125* 
(0.028) 
NAT   0.137 
(0.107) 
 
TRA    0.253* 
(0.039) 
      
DIAGNOSTICS 
 Alpha -1.454 
(1.884) 
0.378 
(3.341) 
-1.557 
(2.796) 
-1.830 
(1.525) 
 WALD 0.440 0.983 0.577 0.230 
 CHI2 
(PROB) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Left cens. 30 
Uncensored 103 
Right cens. 100 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
Note: Values in parenthesis are the standard error statistics. “*”, “**” and “***” imply levels of 
statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
INF is inflation rate, SEXR is exchange rate volatility; DEP is exchange rate depreciation, INT is 
interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign currency.  NAT is resource rent; TRA is trade 
openness, and FINT is the degree of financial integration.  INST measures institutions; FIN is financial 
development and GDP per capita growth (GDP) and international reserves (RES) 
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Table 8: Robustness Test Accounting for Outliers  Sub-sample 
Dependent Variable: Deposit Dollarization 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 
RETURNS INF 0.340* 
(0.075) 
0.255* 
(0.075) 
0.344* 
(0.075) 
0.323* 
(0.074) 
SEXR 0.005*** 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.003) 
0.005*** 
(0.003) 
0.005*** 
(0.003) 
DEP 0.0001 
(0.002) 
0.000006 
(0.00203) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
INT 0.042 
(0.109) 
0.039 
(0.104) 
0.046 
(0.109) 
0.014 
(0.107) 
CONTROLS GDP -1.042*** 
(0.575) 
-1.095** 
(0.559) 
-1.024*** 
(0.579) 
-1.239** 
(0.563) 
INST -4.657* 
(1.653) 
-5.603* 
(1.615) 
-4.835* 
(1.690) 
-3.642** 
(1.696) 
FIN -0.070 
(0.064) 
-0.082 
(0.061) 
-0.074 
(0.073) 
-0.148** 
(0.072) 
RES 1.751* 
(0.504) 
1.636* 
(0.497) 
1.790* 
(0.511) 
1.318** 
(0.539) 
ACCESS TRA  0.116* 
(0.032) 
 0.125* 
(0.028) 
NAT   -0.035 
(0.068) 
 
TRA    1.738** 
(0.860) 
      
DIAGNOSTICS 
 Sigma_u 10.293* 
(2.294) 
9.923* 
(2.276) 
10.346* 
(2.328) 
10.007* 
(2.207) 
 Sigma_e 4.630* 
(0.312) 
4.422* 
(0.200) 
4.618* 
(0.312) 
4.561* 
(0.307) 
 Rho 0.831 
(0.639) 
0.834 
(0.065) 
0.834 
(0.064) 
0.828 
(0.307) 
 CHI2 
(PROB) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Left cens. 2 
Uncensored 125 
Right cens. 94 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
Note: Values in parenthesis are the standard error statistics. “*”, “**” and “***” imply levels of 
statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
INF is inflation rate, SEXR is exchange rate volatility; DEP is exchange rate depreciation, INT is 
interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign currency.  NAT is resource rent; TRA is trade 
openness, and FINT is the degree of financial integration.  INST measures institutions; FIN is financial 
development and GDP per capita growth (GDP) and international reserves (RES). 
 
6.0 Conclusions, Policy Implications and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study has explored and extended the determinants of dollarization. Although the 
literature has a long list of some perceived important determinants of dollarization, 
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this study was able to identify some important determinants that are not too popular in 
the literature. Basically, these hypothesized important determinants are natural 
resource rent, financial liberalization and trade openness.  These three variables are 
tagged “ACCESS”. This is premised on the fact that the more people have access to 
foreign currency, the more economic agents use foreign currency for transactionary 
purposes. The focus of this study was limited to 26 SSA countries for the period 2001 
– 2012. The choice of this scope was due to data availability and limited number of 
studies on dollarization in Africa. The value addition of this study to the literature is 
based on (i) the scope of the study and (ii) the expansion of the model to account for 
ACCESS. 
Our results show that both trade openness and financial integration are 
positive and significant determinants of dollarization in SSA, while the direct 
opposite is the case of natural resource rent. The inability of natural resource rent was 
justified by the notion that the proceeds from the export of the resources are not 
channeled through the domestic financial system. Other important determinants 
include inflation, exchange rate volatility, institutions and financial development. 
These results are robust to different specifications.  
Even though this study was unable to determine that dollarization is a bad 
omen for a country, emphasis should be placed on reducing the incidence of 
dollarization
17
. This might be due, at least using the Latin America experiences, to the 
fact that dollarization is usually caused/induced by macroeconomic instability and 
policy credibility of the government, which are orchestrated by weak domestic 
macroeconomic imbalance, epically though inflation and exchange rate volatility. The 
most effective tool to reduce dollarization is through the adoption of policies that 
would seek to restore the strained confidence in the domestic currency, in particular 
and macroeconomic stability, in general. 
Among the mechanisms that can help achieve this laudable policy stance is the 
design of policies that would seek to improve the level of governance/institutions, 
financial development and economic growth. In the same line of reasoning, SSA 
countries should be open to the rest of the world in terms of financial and trade 
services. In continuance, inflation and exchange rate volatility should be reduced, as 
                                                        
17
On the one hand, this is due to the fact that this (an enquiry into the net effect of dollarization) does 
not fall within the objective of the study. On the other hand, no study, we are aware of, has been able to 
categorically find the net effect of dollarization. Studies that have concluded that the net effect of 
dollarization is difficult to estimate include Eichengreen (2000 and 2001) and Karras (2002). 
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excessive levels of inflation increase and encourage the use of foreign currency within 
the domestic economy. 
It is erroneous to assume that inflation, at all levels is bad for the economy. 
Some level (low) of inflation might still be consistent and help in achieving the aim of 
some macroeconomic and monetary policies, among which is the reduction of 
dollarization. Hence, future studies should try to obtain the optimal level of inflation, 
which would be consistent with the aim of reducing dollarization, among others. This 
study was unable to examine the effect of exchange regime on dollarization. The 
importance of exchange rate regime on the dollarization process cannot be under 
estimated. As such, future studies should channel efforts to unraveling this important 
factor. 
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